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This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion 
formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the 
latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. 
According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the 
informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is 
reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an 
increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis 
is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with 
its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The 
second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the 
decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation 
of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument 
should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when 
differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings 
were consistent with such an analysis. 
In developing an opinion on an issue a person often must decide among 
alternative positions, beliefs, solutions, courses of action, etc. An in- 
formative argument is one that enables the individual to achieve this 
end, namely, to make a choice or at least to narrow the range of possibilities, 
while an uninformative argument is one that does not. This paper examines 
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the possibility that in opinion formation, arguments are marked in memory 
according to their informativeness. 
Intuitively we know that an informative argument is encoded differently 
than an uninformative one. For example, suppose one were asked, “Should 
Mary drive or walk to work?” The argument “She wears glasses to 
correct near-sightedness” by itself is uninformative inasmuch as it has 
no direct bearing on the opinion. Hence, we expect that this piece of 
information will be processed with minimal elaboration, no more than 
is needed to understand it as a discrete (and tangential) fact. The very 
same argument, however, becomes highly informative when it appears 
together with another piece of information, say, “She broke her glasses 
last night at a party.” Now one feels that both propositions ought to be 
tightly linked and elaborated upon. That is, inferences will be drawn 
based on prior knowledge about the consequences of driving without 
glasses (e.g., “Last week Igor, who has the same eye problem, tried to 
drive without glasses and had a bad accident”), and both propositions 
and inferences will be represented within a single unified memory structure. 
There is, in fact, a decent amount of evidence to support the above 
point of view: Recent research suggests that arguments that are informative 
receive more attention (Fiske, 19801, are more accessible (Carlston, 1980; 
Judd & Kulik, 1980; Lingle, Geva, Ostrom, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 
19791, and have greater impact on judgments (Burnstein & Schul, 1982; 
Fiske, 1980; Tyler, 1980; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978) than those that 
are uninformative-or conversely, when an uninformative argument is 
encountered during opinion formation, it is comprehended more narrowly, 
with less elaboration, than an informative one. 
Elaboration, of course, does not depend only on the informativeness 
of an argument. We know that thematicully related arguments are au- 
tomatically associated and elaborated upon independently of their in- 
formativeness (e.g., Anderson, 1976; Burnstein & Schul, 1982; Mandler, 
1979; Smith, Adams, & Schorr, 1978). This means that if arguments are 
thematically related, they will be linked by a denser network of associations 
than if they are unrelated. For instance, the statement “Mary wears 
glasses to correct near-sightedness” will receive greater elaboration when 
it appears together with the argument “Mary’s father is an optometrist” 
than when it accompanies the argument “The price of gas is really 
soaring.” In the former case the two arguments are linked to each other 
via general knowledge about “glasses,” “optometrists,” “optometrists’ 
daughters,” etc. In the latter case, the two propositions are more likely 
to be represented as discrete pieces of information. 
There is, in addition, a less straightforward prediction that can be 
made about recall in an opinion formation task, namely, that there will 
be an order effect whereby informative arguments are activated earlier 
than uninformative ones. To derive this prediction let us describe briefly 
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our analysis of the process of opinion formation (Burnstein & Schul, 
1982): We divide opinion formation into several distinct mental operations, 
namely, initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. 
During initial encoding the physical representation of the argument 
undergoes perceptual analysis and segmentation whereby it is transformed 
into symbolic structures. Elaborative encoding refers to the process by 
which each argument is linked with general information represented in 
the form of schemata. As a result, each argument is supplemented by 
the knowledge contained in its particular encoding schema. The opinion 
formation task also requires that the person eventually integrate diverse 
arguments on the topic so that they are represented in a coherent and 
consistent manner. This means that at some point the separate arguments 
have to be encoded within one and the same schema. Integration, in 
turn, prepares the information for the final operation, the decision, whereby 
the now-integrated arguments are interpreted within an evaluative schema 
and this evaluation is translated into a response format, such as a 6- 
point scale, a frown, a smile, etc. (See Burnstein & Schul (1982) for a 
more detailed description.) 
In the present study arguments are processed within a particular context. 
One important element of this context, the starter question (e.g., “Should 
Mary drive or walk to work?“), activates a schema for encoding succeeding 
arguments (e.g., “She broke her glasses last night at a party”). The 
elaborations made during encoding (e.g.? “Last week Igor, who has the 
same eye problem, tried to drive without his glasses and had a bad 
accident”) provide additional contextual elements. Eventually the ar- 
guments and the elaborations made on them are integrated to arrive at 
a decision (e.g., “She ought to walk!“), which itself then becomes a 
significant contextual element in the representation (see below). In prop- 
ositional network models such as Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973) 
contextual elements in general are termed list markers and refer to in- 
formation activated during encoding that designate items as belonging 
to a specific set. There is an important class of markers that represent 
the gist of the items within a set. These are called headers or prototype 
markers. They identify the set as a whole and differentiate it from other 
sets. 
We will assume that the representation of the decision, that is, the 
opinion or judgment, serves as a prototype marker for the set of arguments 
underlying it. Burnstein and Schul (1982) provided some evidence to 
show that the decision is a functionally distinct operation in opinion 
formation. Evidence that the decision has a distinct representation in 
memory (vis a vis trait information) was obtained by N. Anderson and 
associates using the methods of “cognitive algebra” (Anderson & Hubert, 
1963; Anderson & Farkas, 1973; Riskey, 1979). Additional support for 
the decision being stored separately was presented by Posner and Snyder 
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(1975). They concluded that impression formation produces “two memory 
structures, one consisting of a list of item names [the traits], and the 
other consisting of a general emotional response to the items” (pp. 79- 
80). Moreover, studies using semantic material other than trait descriptions 
generally indicate that when information is integrated its gist is abstracted 
and stored separately as a header (or tag-node) of the larger structure 
(Hayes-Roth, 1977; Hebb, 1949: Reder & Anderson, 1980). Finally, there 
are recent findings (e.g., Lingle & Ostrom, 1979; Ebbesen, 1980; Schul, 
1981) suggesting that in an impression formation task the decision may 
be retrieved independent of the trait information, 
During recall, according to Anderson and Bower, reinstatement of 
context (i.e., presentation of the starter question) activates the prototype 
marker (i.e., the decision). A search is then carried out from this node 
extending along the marked paths. These are associations labeling ar- 
guments as belonging to the same opinion domain. When a node is 
reached with no outgoing paths that are marked (i.e., the arguments 
accessible from this node are not recognized as falling within the opinion 
domain), another list marker is activated and the search resumes. 
As a last step in our analysis of recall order and informativeness, 
consider that two items will be associated in memory to the extent that 
there is an inferential (or semantically “causal”) relationship between 
them (Dooling & Christiaansen. 1977: Reder, 1979; Spiro, 1977; Tversky 
& Kahneman. 1978). Thus we assume a marked path between a decision 
and the arguments that “caused” it: When the starter question (“Should 
Mary drive or walk to work?“) initiates recall, individuals will tend first 
to think of the opinion header, that is, their decision (“She ought to 
walk!“). and then to think of informative arguments, that is, the reasons 
for the decision (“She broke her glasses”). Uninformative arguments 
will be recalled only later when there is a marked path between their 
node and that of an informative argument (e.g., a common theme) or 
when they are associated with a (nonprototype) opinion marker that is 
not activated until the marked paths radiating from the prototype marker 
have been exhausted. Thus, the Anderson-Bower model suggests that 
informative arguments occupy a central position, and uninformative ar- 
guments, a peripheral position in the representation of an opinion.’ 
To summarize, elaborative encoding of arguments is assumed to depend 
on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments, and (ii) their 
thematic relatedness. It is reasonably well established that the likelihood 
of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of 
elaboration performed on it. Therefore, our first hypothesis implies that 
’ Comparable analyses demonstrating the importance of the central-peripheral distinction 
for chacterizing informative and uninformative arguments in the area of attitude change 
and persuasion can be found in Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). Peak. (1958), Rosenberg and 
Abelson. (1960). Wishner, (1960). and Zajonc. (1960). 
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the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and 
with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. Our second hypothesis 
assumes that by dint of their close association with header or prototype 
information, in particular the decision, informative arguments occupy a 
more central position than uninformative arguments. Hence, informative 
arguments should be accessed and reported prior to uninformative ar- 
guments, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of 
recall) are controlled. 
Overview 
METHOD 
The study consisted of two parts. In the first part subjects were given a series of 
hypothetical “situations.” These were presented in the form of a starter question followed 
by five arguments that varied in their informativeness and in their thematic relatedness. 
Subjects expressed an opinion about each situation on the basis of these arguments. During 
the second part, subjects were given a surprise cued recall test where they were presented 
with the starter questions and were asked to recall the arguments associated with them. 
Subjects 
Thirty-six undergraduates at the University of Michigan participated in the experiment 
as a partial fulfillment of their introductory psychology course requirement. 
Apparatus 
Subjects were seated in individual booths, equipped with a I?-in. monitor and a 6-button 
response box (buttons labeled from “1” to “6”). Presentation of the stimuli was controlled 
by a PDP-I 1 computer system with responses and reaction times recorded under a program’s 
control. 
Stimuli 
The first part consisted of 18 segments. In each of them subjects were presented with 
a dilemma-like situation consisting of a starter question and five arguments. The arguments 
varied in their informativeness and/or their relatedness to another argument. Specifically, 
there were four categories of arguments: 
(a) arguments that were informative in regard to the decision and were thematically 
related to another argument (I-R type arguments); 
(b) arguments that were informative but not related to another argument (I-NR type 
arguments); 
(c) arguments that were related to another argument but not informative in regard to 
the decision (NI-R type arguments); 
(d) arguments that were neither informative nor related to another argument (NI-NR 
type arguments). 
One of the starter questions and its attendant arguments is shown in Table I. The other 
seven experimental segments (see design section) were cued by the following: 
(I) “Which graduate school should Mike go to, A or B?” 
(2) “Tim is a wealthy investor who must decide whether to finance project G or H.” 
(3) “Should Bob live in apartment house Q or apartment house P?” 
(4) “Should Jane go to a movie or stay home and study?” 
(5) “Should Ron shop at Stop-N-Shop or Fastway?” 
(6) “Ray must decide between two cars, either a Champion or a Roadster.” 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































428 SCHUL AND BURNSTEIN 
Design 
Out of the I8 segments, 2 were used for practice and 8 were used as fillers. They 
contained arguments from the above four categories and were the same for all subjects. 
The remaining eight segments will be termed the e,rperimenral segments. In each of the 
experimental segments. the situation and four of the arguments associated with it were 
identical for all subjects. Two of these arguments were I-NR and one was NI-NR (see 
Table Il. The relatedness of the fourth argument (the turget argument, hereafter) to the 
fifth argument varied between conditions as a function of the latter (the mediating argument, 
hereafter). The three experimental conditions (a between subject factor) differ in respect 
to the mediating argument, and thereby in respect to the status of the target argument. 
Note that the content of the target argument remained the same regardless of its status. 
The three conditions are labeled according to the status of the target argument. 
In the informarit~e-related condition, the mediating argument was not only thematically 
linked to the target argument but it also made the latter informative in respect to the 
decision; in the uninformative-related condition, the mediating argument was related to 
the target argument, but the two were not relevant to the opinion task-they were unin- 
formative: finally, in the uninformuti\,e-Itnreluted condition the mediating argument was 
not related to the target argument, nor was the latter informative. 
Procedure 
Subjects participated in groups ranging in size from one to six. Upon arriving at the 
laboratory, they were randomly assigned to an experimental condition (with the constraint 
that there be an equal number per condition) and seated in an individual booth. After 
reading the instructions, they responded to two practice segments that acquainted them 
with the monitor, the response box, and the experimental procedure. After the two practice 
segments were completed, the experimenter answered questions and the subjects were 
presented with the remaining I6 segments. 
The presentation structure of each segment was as follows: 
(a) The sentence describing the situation, that is, the starter question, appeared on the 
monitor for a fixed time (.6 set per word) and was erased. 
(b) The five arguments were then presented one at a time (.4 set per word), with a ?- 
set interval between arguments. 
(cl Next. the starter question was again displayed on the screen along with a 6-point 
scale. The end points of the scale were marked with the “situation” alternatives (e.g.. 
“Walk to school.” ” Drive to school”). The subjects then responded by pressing one of 
the buttons on the response box. These responses reflected the subject’s opinion on which 
alternative to choose. The presentation order of the segments as well as the presentation 
order of arguments within a segment were randomized differently for each subject. 
Once this part was completed, subjects were given a surprise recall test. This was done 
in a booklet that presented the eight experimental plus four filler “situations” in a fixed 
order. Every page of this booklet contained two starter questions, each of which was 
followed by five blank lines. Subjects were asked to list as many arguments for each 
situation as they could recall. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Recall data were coded by three judges. An item was said to be 
correctly recalled if it rephrased the original (i.e., contained its gist). It 
was coded as incorrect otherwise (i.e., either it was not recalled at all, 
it was recalled inaccurately, or it was recalled in the wrong “situation”). 
The three judges agreed on 90% of the cases. In 99% of the cases there 
was a majority (i.e., two judges agreed). The remaining cases consisted 
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of items in which the judges could not classify according to the original 
argument, and therefore, they were discarded. Analyses of cases in which 
a majority of the judges agreed were performed separately from those 
in which all three judges agreed. There were no appreciable differences 
between these two sets of analyses, and only the former will be reported. 
Accuracy of Recall 
First, we examined the accuracy with which the different types of 
arguments were recalled. For each subject we computed the accuracy 
(i.e., percent correct) with which he or she recalled each type of argument 
across the eight experimental segments. It is important to keep in mind 
that regardless of the experimental condition, every subject received 
three identical arguments in each segment (see Table l), two of which 
were informative but not related (I-NR) and one that was neither in- 
formative nor related (NI-NR). A two-way ANOVA (experimental con- 
dition x argument type) was performed on the accuracy rates with which 
these arguments were recalled. There was no reliable difference between 
the three experimental conditions (F(2, 33) < I), nor was there a reliable 
interaction between argument type and experimental condition (F(2, 33) 
= 2.64, p > .08). As hypothesized, however, informative arguments 
were recalled better than uninformative ones (.65 and .48, respectively), 
F(1, 33) = 29.42, p < .Ol. 
In order to determine whether the relatedness of an argument facilitates 
its retrieval, we examined the accuracy with which the mediating arguments 
were recalled. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were reliable 
differences between the three experimental conditions (F(2, 33) = 6.97, 
p < .Ol). Informative and related (I-R) arguments were recalled only 
marginally better than informative and unrelated (I-NR) arguments (.80 
vs .65, respectively), t(33) = 1.67, p < .l. At the same time, the I-NR 
arguments were recalled significantly better than NI-R arguments (.45), 
that is, those that were related but not informative, t(33) = 2.12, p < 
.05. 
The above analysis confounds the type of argument with its semantic 
content, although there is no reason to suspect that this produced any 
systematic bias. In any case, an analysis of the target argument enables 
us to eliminate this confound. Remember that the informativeness and/or 
relatedness of a target argument were manipulated via its mediating 
argument. Therefore, this analysis involves comparisons among identical 
target arguments with identical retrieval cues. A one-way ANOVA was 
performed on the accuracy with which subjects recalled the target ar- 
guments. It revealed a reliable difference between the three experimental 
conditions (F(2, 33) = 9.90, p < .Ol). Subjects in the informative-related 
condition recalled the target arguments better than those in the unin- 
formative-re/ated condition (.88 vs .64, respectively), t(33) = 2.74, p < 
430 SCHUL AND BURNSTEIN 
.05. Subjects in the latter condition, in turn, recalled the target argument 
better than those in the uninformative-unrelated condition (.50), t(33) 
= 1.79, p < .Ol. To summarize. (i) informative arguments are more 
likely to be retrieved than uninformative arguments; (ii) related arguments 
are more likely to be retrieved than unrelated arguments: and finally, 
(iii) it appears that informativeness may have a stronger effect than 
relatedness on the retrievability of arguments. However, the question of 
how informativeness and relatedness interact to determine accessibility 
cannot be answered on the basis of the present design. 
Clustering in Recall 
In order to obtain further support for the hypothesis that informativeness 
and relatedness affect the elaboration a proposition receives, we compared 
the degree of association between the target and the mediating arguments 
under our three experimental conditions. Elaborative encoding in the 
present context involves the creation of associative links among the 
propositions in the communication as well as links between the latter 
and schematic knowledge. The extent to which this operation is performed 
should be reflected in the strength of association between the arguments. 
If the two arguments are highly associated, that is, clustered in memory, 
then the recall of one should be accompanied by the recall of the other. 
In other words, either both arguments are accessed, or neither is accessed. 
If, however, they are not associated, the recall of one argument should 
be independent of the recall of the other. 
For each subject the rho correlation coefficient (Bishop, Fienberg, & 
Holland, 1975) was computed to estimate the association in the recall 
of the target and the mediating arguments over the eight “situations.” 
A one-way ANOVA was performed on these coefficients to determine 
whether they varied as a function of the experimental condition2 The 
analysis revealed that the three conditions reliably differed from each 
other (F(2, 27) = 7.04, p < .Ol). Specifically, when the arguments were 
both informative and related they were more highly associated than when 
they were related but not informative (rhos .57 and .23, respectively, 
t(27) = 1.98, p < .06). Moreover, arguments were least associated when 
they were neither informative nor related (rho = - .06). This suggests 
that the effects of informativeness and thematic relatedness are combined 
to produce a more accessible representation than either separately. Thus, 
the hypothesis that the elaboration an argument receives increases with 
its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments 
in the communication is reasonably well supported. 
’ Four subjects in the IR condition and one in each of the other two conditions had to 
be dropped from the analysis because they recalled all the target argument perfectly (and 
hence the rho could not have been computed). 
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Priority in Recall 
According to our analysis, not only should informative arguments be 
recalled better than uninformative ones, but they should also be accessed 
prior to them. Typically, there is a substantial positive correlation between 
the probability that an argument will be recaped and its serial position 
in recall. Our hypothesis, however, is that informative arguments will 
have priority of entry even ashen the probability of recall is controlled. 
In contrast, the relatedness of the arguments should not affect its priority 
of entry once recall probability is controlled. Ideally, these hypotheses 
should have been tested simultaneously in a two-way ANOVA with 
informativeness and relatedness as the independent variables. Since the 
design of the present experiment does not permit such an analysis, each 
of these hypotheses had to be examined separately (but see below). 
For each subject we computed a set of difference scores, each cor- 
responding to a difference between the proportion of cases an informative 
argument was reported prior to an uninformative one, and the proportion 
of cases the uninformative argument was reported prior to the informative 
one. This was done only in cases when both informative and uninformative 
arguments were recalled (so that the probability of recall is controlled). 
These differences were averaged per subject across all informa- 
tive/uninformative pairs to yield a priority index (Pr). Note that this 
index of priority is computed across the two levels of relatedness3 If 
informative arguments are not accessed prior to uninformative ones, Pr 
should not be different from zero. In fact, mean Pr was .I3 (t(35) = 
2.02, p = .05), indicating that informative arguments tend to be accessed 
prior to uninformative arguments, even when the likelihood of recall is 
controlled. 
In order to examine the effects of relatedness on the priority of entry, 
we repeated the above analysis, that is, we computed a second priority 
index, but this time on the basis of relatedness rather than informativeness. 
If related arguments have priority in recall over unrelated ones, the 
results of this analysis should have been similar to those in the previous 
analysis. In fact, relatedness did not have a statistically significant effect 
(Pr = .04, t(35) = .8). 
Finally, even though it was not possible to perform a complete two 
way ANOVA (relatedness x informativeness), we compared the effects 
of arguments types within each experimental condition (cf. Table 1) on 
the priority of informative arguments in recall. Due to the small number 
of observations in each analysis, none of the differences reached acceptable 
levels of significance. Nonetheless, they were all in the predicted direction. 
’ In fact. this analysis may be biased agcrinst our hypotheses. Note that there are more 
I-NR arguments than NILNR arguments. This means that the likelihood of an argument 
being difficult to access because it is unrelated is greater for informative than for uninformative 
arguments. Since accessibility and recall order are correlated. it follows that even when 
both are recalled, uninformative arguments should be reported prior to informative arguments. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
An opinion formation task demands that individuals elaborate upon a 
list of arguments, integrate the resultant knowledge into a unitary rep- 
resentation, and come to a decision. The decision functions as a header 
or prototype marker that tags the arguments for pertinence, namely, their 
usefulness in arriving at an opinion. We have called such arguments 
informative. Our analysis suggested that informative arguments lend 
themselves to elaborative encoding to a larger extent than uninformative 
arguments. Hence, informative arguments will be accessed more readily 
than uninformative arguments. In addition, informative arguments, unlike 
uninformative ones, have a semantically “causal” or inferential relationship 
to the decision and thereby should be closely associated with the decision 
in memory. If the decision is in fact a prototype marker, it will be 
activated as soon as the person searches the particular opinion domain 
for arguments. As a result, informative arguments should be accessed 
prior to uninformative arguments. Our findings support such an analysis. 
First, memory for informative arguments was superior to that for un- 
informative arguments. Second, when the probability of recall was con- 
trolled, informative arguments were retrieved prior to uninformative ones. 
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